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Abstract—In the Internet-of-Things, the number of connected 
devices is expected to be extremely huge, i.e., more than a couple 
of ten billion. It is however well-known that the security for the 
Internet-of-Things is still open problem. In particular, it is 
difficult to certify the identification of connected devices and to 
prevent the illegal spoofing. It is because the conventional security 
technologies have advanced for mainly protecting logical network 
and not for physical network like the Internet-of-Things. In order 
to protect the Internet-of-Things with advanced security 
technologies, we propose a new concept (Physical-Logical Link 
layer) which is a well-designed combination of physical chip 
identification and blockchain. With a proposed solution of the 
physical chip identification, the physical addresses of connected 
devices are uniquely connected to the logical addresses to be 
protected by blockchain.  
Keywords—Internet-of-Things (IoT); Blockchain; Security; 
Physical Chip Identification (Physical Chip-ID); Physical-Logical 
Link; Connected Devices; Logical Address; Physical Address;  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Network security has been a hot topic as the computer 
network becomes spread all over the world. Any existing 
commercial applications and services would be unseen without 
modern encryption technology [1]. If data to be  exchanged on 
the network is easily stolen and read by someone, no customers 
can trust those services. On contrary, if a strong encryption 
forces customers spend time and money to protect their 
communication on the network, the services would be detested. 
Therefore, the security technology has been developed by 
considering balance between solidity (security) and flexibility 
(convenience). It is preferable that communication is certainly 
protected by least effort of customers and lowest cost. Thus, the 
operation of encryption and protocol may be manipulated by 
software. However, this simultaneously reduces the cost of 
hacking. Hackers can connect an attacking target via network 
without physically moving and then attack the target with 
software. Once a hacker finds a vulnerability of the protection, 
the whole hackers all over the world may be able to attack the 
vulnerable targets. Then, the security system must be revised to 
resolve the known vulnerabilities. If a hacker finds a new 
vulnerability, the security system must be revised again. By this 
way, such revisions are limitlessly repeated.  
Following Diffie and Hellman [2], Alice may give her public 
key to Bob while saving her secret key by herself. Bob can send 
Alice a letter encrypted by her public key. Only Alice can 
decrypt and read the letter with her secret key, because no others 
have her secret key. It is noted here that the letter for Alice must 
be exposed on the network in order to send it to her. 
Theoretically, everyone on the network can receive it. However, 
since none can actually read it other than Alice, we can regard 
that the letter is delivered to Alice certainly. With this regard, 
the public key can be turned out to serve as her logical address 
on the network. As long as the public key encryption is not 
broken, everyone is able to securely exchange communications 
on the network at lowest cost.  
As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), there are plurality of logical nodes 
(depicted circles) respectively having logical addresses above 
logical layer-1. In this logical layer-1, the communication (data 
transaction) between logical nodes is assumed to be protected by 
encryption system-1, for example. Suppose that encryption 
system-1 is broken. The defenders of logical network are forced 
to fix vulnerability so as to found logical layer-2 to be protected 
by encryption system-2, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b). If encryption 
sytem-2 is subsequently broken, logical layer-3 to be protected 
by encryption system-3 is found on logical layer-2, as illustrated 
in Fig. 1(c). By this way, logical layers have been repeatedly 
laminated above datalink layer, every when the security system 
is reinforced and updated. As an example, the protocols of 
logical layer-1, -2 and -3 are TCP/IP, https and OAuth, 
respectively. 
 A great breakthrough has occurred; which is called 
blockchain playing a central role of bitcoin technology [3]. The 
cryptocurrency is thus allowed to be sent directly from one party 
to another without going through a financial institution. This is 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) transaction. Bitcoin is the first realization of 
this concept. As illustrated in Fig. 2, bitcoin address serves as 
logical address on the logical network. The transaction among 
those logical addresses is practically-strictly protected from 
illegal falsification, as long as blockchain is long enough. 
Thereby, blockchain has ignited FINTECH 2.0 in most recent 
years. (Blockchain and its limitation are briefly reviewed in Sec. 
II.) .  
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 1(a) - (b) and Fig. 2, 
there are plurality of physical nodes (depicted by squares) 
respectively having physical addresses below physical layer. 
The protocol of physical layer may be usually Ethernet as an 
example. Those physical nodes can exchange data (e.g. frame) 
with going through physical layer and not through blockchain 
and not through any logical layers. Therefore, neither 
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 blockchain nor the conventional security system can protect the 
data transaction between physical nodes. It is because physical 
addresses and logical addresses are independent each other.  
Indeed, Internet-of-Things (IoT) is a physical network 
comprising huge number of connected devices (hardware). 
Those connected devices are physical nodes respectively having 
physical addresses. In this work, we propose a new concept 
(Physical-Logical Link) to uniquely link physical addresses to 
logical addresses with physical chip identification and public 
key encryption. Thereby, blockchain is allowed to protect IoT. 
In addition, Physical-Logical Link is fully compatible to 
blockchain. It means that Physical-Logical Link can be validated 
anywhere blockchain works.  
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN [3] 
A. Transaction  
Fig. 3 illustrates a series of transactions from logical node 
(N-2) to (N-1) and from logical node (N-1) to logical node (N). 
The bulk squares are transaction units comprising public keys, 
hash values and electronic signatures. The logical node (N-2) 
comprises the transaction unit (N-2) and the secret key (N-2); 
i.e., the public key (N-2), the secret key (N-2), the hash value 
(N-3), and the electronic signature (N-3). The logical node (N-
1) comprises the transaction unit (N-1) and the secret key (N-1); 
i.e., the public key (N-1), the secret key (N-1), the hash value 
(N-2), and the electronic signature (N-2). The logical node (N) 
comprises the transaction unit (N) and the secret key (N); i.e., 
the public key (N), the secret key (N), the hash value (N-1), and 
the electronic signature (N-1). The public keys (N-2), (N-1) and 
(N) make the couples with the secret keys (N-2), (N-1) and (N), 
respectively. As mentioned above, the public keys (N-2), (N-1) 
and (N) are the logical addresses (N-2), (N-1) and (N), 
respectively. The hash value (N-1) is generated from the 
transaction unit (N-1) by a hash function (e.g., SHA-256). Then, 
the hash value (N-1) is to be transferred from the logical node 
(N-1) to (N) with attaching sender’s logical address (N-1) and 
the previous sender’s electronic signature (N-2). The hash value 
(N-2) has been transferred from logical node (N-2) to (N-1) with 
attaching sender’s logical address (N-2) and the previous 
sender’s electronic signature (N-3). The hash value (N-3) has 
been transferred from logical node (N-3) to (N-2) with attaching 
sender’s logical address (N-3) and the previous sender’s 
electronic signature (N-4), and so forth. At last, the logical 
address (N) saves the hash value (N-1) with attaching all past 
senders’ logical addresses (N-1), (N-2), (N-3)… and the 
electronic signatures (N-2), (N-3), (N-4)…, respectively; which 
is the signed transferring record of the latest data.  
The electronic signature (N-1) is generated from the public 
key (N) and the hash value (N-1) with using the secret key (N-
1). It is noted that the electronic signature (N-2) is included into 
the hash value (N-1) to be sent to the logical node (N). In the 
logical node (N), we can decrypt the electronic signature (N-1) 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Communication layer including blockchain 
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 with using the public key (N-1) and then check if it coincides 
with a set of the public key (N) and the hash value (N-1). The 
electronic signature (N-2) is generated from the public key (N-
1) and the hash value (N-2) with using secret key (N-2). It is 
noted that the electronic signature (N-3) is included into the hash 
value (N-2) to be sent to the logical node (N-1). In the logical 
node (N-1), we can decrypt the electronic signature (N-2) with 
using the public key (N-2) and then check if it coincides with a 
set of the public key (N-1) and the hash value (N-2). And so 
forth.  
B. Blockchain 
The signed transferring record is thereby included to the 
latest hash value. In general, a plurality of logical nodes may be 
able to transfer data to a latest logical node. Then, the trajectory 
of transferring record may form a tree diagram; which is called 
Merkle’s tree [4], as illustrated in Fig. 4. Each dashed arrow 
corresponds to the data transfer illustrated in Fig. 3. In this 
example, there is the latest one at the bottom, which has come 
from three hash values A, B and C. The hash value A has come 
from A1 and A2. The hash value A2 has come from A21 and 
A22. And so forth. No matter how complicated or various the 
tree diagram is, there is only the latest one at the bottom.  This 
is called “Root of Merkle” and can be the representative of all 
hash values and all dashed arrows which are included into a 
same Merkle’s tree.  
Usually, several  hundred transactions are bunched to form a 
block labeled by a Root of Merkle. As illustrated in Fig. 5, the 
block (M-1) comprises the Root of Merkle (M-1),  the nonce (M-
1), and the block hash (M-2). The block hash (M-1) is generated 
by hashing the block (M-1), where the nonce (M-1) is tuned to 
let the first 16 bits be all zero in the block hash (M-1). Since the 
hash function is irreversible, this tuning costs some 
computational power. The generated block hash is publicized on 
the network to be registered. In this example, the block (M-1) is 
registered by finding the tuned nonce (M-1). The generated 
block hash (M-1) is publicized on the network and then the Root 
of Merkle (M-1) is linked to the previous block (M-2) by the 
hashing. Then, it can be the linkage requirement that the first 16 
bits are all zero in the generated block hash. Suppose a user finds 
a new bunch of transactions having not registered yet, which is 
labeled by the Root of Merkle (M). If he succeeds to tune nonce 
(M) to satisfy the linkage requirement, then  he can register the 
new block (M) and then link it to the block (M-1). By repeating 
 
 
Fig. 3: Data transaction between logical nodes, wherein the dashed arrows denote the hashing. 
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Fig. 4: Merkle’s Tree, wherein the dashed arrows denote the hashing 
related to data transactions. “Latest” at bottom is Root of Merkle.  
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 this registration of new blocks from the past to the future, the 
blockchain is formed, as illustrated in Fig. 6.  
C. The length of blockchain and the strength of anti-
tampering 
Suppose that a hacker tampers a transaction of data related 
to the hash value A2 in Fig. 4. This tampering influences the 
hash value A. At last, the latest hash value (“Latest” at bottom) 
is influenced. This means that tampering a part of transaction 
record must change the Root of Merkle. Suppose that the Root 
of Merkle (M-1) is changed by this tampering. This breaks the 
linkage requirement that the first 16 bits are all zero in the block 
hash (M-1). In order to recover the linkage, the nonce (M-1) is 
forced to be revised to keep the linkage requirement from the 
block (M-1) to (M). However, this must change the block hash 
(M-1) and then the linkage of blocks (M) and (M+1) is broken. 
To recover this linkage, the nonce (M) is also forced to be 
revised. Like this, we are forced to revise nonce (M+1), nonce 
(M+2), nonce (M+3)… By this way, as the length of blockchain 
is increased, more computational power must be consumed to 
tamper a part of transaction record. Therefore, the strength of 
anti-tampering of transaction record is enhanced as the length of 
blockchain is increased.  
D. Limitation of Blockchain Protection 
All logical nodes have logical addresses, respectively. The 
transaction between those logical nodes are protected by 
blockchain, as explained in the above. Any applications to be 
served on the blockchain infrastructure is software. The logical 
addresses are allocated to accounts of software, respectively. 
According to the public key encryption, public keys are uniquely 
coupled to secret keys, respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 7. As 
long as secret keys are protected, the blockchain can prevent the 
illegal falsification of data transaction between logical 
addresses.   
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Linkage of Block-to-Block, wherein the dashed arrows denote the hashing.  
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Fig. 6: Blockchain, wherein the dotted square corresponds to the linkage in Fig. 5. 
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 However, the transaction in IoT is performed between 
physical addresses which are respectively allocated to connected 
devices (hardware).  Therefore, the existing blockchain cannot 
prevent the illegal falsification of transaction history among 
connected devices.  
III. NEW CONCEPT TO PROTECT INTERNET-OF-THINGS 
As mentioned above, the first serious problem is that 
physical address is disconnected from logical nodes; then the 
advanced security technologies protecting those logical nodes 
cannot protect the data transaction between physical addresses.  
In recent years, the majority of connected devices is 
changing from computers to smaller and various devices; it is 
expected that there are 5-10 devices per person in average in 
2020 [5]. Then, the number of connected devices is drastically 
increased to become from 26 – 50 billion by 2020 [5], [6]. The  
serious open issue is therefore how to protect the whole 
connected devices from the illegal spoofing of physical address.  
A. Physical Chip Identificaiton 
The physical address having been used extensively is the 
media-access-controller address (MAC address). However, it is 
well-known that MAC address is editable; then two different 
connected devices may be able to have a same MAC address. 
This means that MAC address is not real physical address. The 
physical addresses should be therefore uniquely allocated to 
connected devices, respectively. The data transaction between 
allocated physical addresses must be always identical to that 
between those connected devices.  
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Data transaction between logical addresses protected by blockchain 
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Fig. 8: A part of generated physical chip identification code (Chip-ID); which has been turned out to be unchanged even after heating acceleration test at 125 C° 
for 168 hours. A pair of secret key and public key can be generated from the full version of this code.  
0000000110100111110000000001101011011100000000011100010000000000000111011011110
0000000100000010100100000001000001011111000000010001100011110000000100011100100
0000000010001111001110000000100100111010000000001001011011100000000010011001101
0100000001101110010000000000011011111101000000000111000000001100000001110100000
0100000000111010000001100000010000011010001000000100001010001010000001000010101
0101000000100100110001100000001001001111100100000010011101110101000000100111111
1111000000010100100000000000000101011100111100000001010111100010100000010110001
1010110000001011001110101000000010111001101010000000110000001100110000001100010
1010111000000110101000000000000001101100100101000000011011100110101000000110111
1010110000000011100111100101000000111100000010100000001111010000000100000011110
1100011010000001111100100101100000011111010110011000000111110110111010000001111
1110001010000000001101001111100000000011010110111000000000111000100000000000001
1101101111000000001000000101001000000010000010111110000000100011000111100000001
0001110010000000000100011110011100000001001001110100000000010010110111000000000
1001100110101000000011011100100000000000110111111010000000001110000000011000000
0111010000001000000001110100000011000000100000110100010000001000010100010100000
0100001010101010000001001001100011000000010010011111001000000100111011101010000
0010011111111110000000101001000000000000001010111001111000000010101111000101000
0001011000110101100000010110011101010000000101110011010100000001100000011001100
0000110001010101110000001101010000000000000011011001001010000000110111001101010
0000011011110101100000000111001111001010000001111000000101000000011110100000001
0000001111011000110100000011111001001011000000111110101100110000001111101101110
1000000111………………..
 A smallest component of connected device is a semiconductor 
chip. Therefore, to define physical address of a connected device 
is equivalent to identify a semiconductor chip on the network. It 
is the physical chip identification. The practical implementation 
of physical chip identification is to extract physical randomness 
from mass-product semiconductor memory chip which is 
included in connected devices. We demonstrate in the 
conference that the physical chip identification is generated in 
the manufacturing semiconductor memory chip with no change 
in front-end process. We call it the identification random access 
memory (IDRAM) in this report. The IDRAM can generate 
physical chip identification and also serve as memory chip. 
Therefore, IDRAM is the cheapest solution for physical chip 
identification to be easily implemented into connected devices 
having at least one memory chip. The IDRAM might be similar 
to physically unclonable function (PUF) [7], [8]. However, the 
goal of this report is whether or not blockchain can protect IoT. 
Whether or not IDRAM is a variety of PUF may be discussed 
elsewhere. Hence, the property of IDRAM is briefly explained 
below; which has different characteristics from [7], [8]. 
Fig. 8 is a part of a physical chip identification code (Chip-
ID) generated from a mass-product semiconductor memory 
process. The information quantity of IDRAM is estimated to be 
about 1.0E1,042,102 if the IDRAM is manufactured with the 
manufacturing line of a commercial 4Gbit memory products. 
Even though one-trillion chips are shipped all over the world, 
the possibility that two different chips accidentally have a same 
chip identification is about 1.0E1,042,090. This can be 
regarded as practically zero. It is also noted that IDRAM can 
also serve as 4Gbit mass-product memory chip with no practical 
loss of bit capacity.  
 The data retention characteristics is also demonstrated in the 
conference. First of all, we have already carried out the heating 
acceleration test of 1,116 IDRAM chips as follows; 1) we 
measured the identification codes generated from those 1,116 
IDRAM chips. Next, these 1,116 IDRAM chips were heated at 
125 degree Celsius (C°) for 168 hours. This condition is 
identical to that for ten years data retention in mass-product flash 
memories. 3) We measured the identification codes generated 
from the 1,116 IDRAM chips again. (See Fig. 8. It is a part of 
the read identification code from one of the 1,116 IDRAM 
chips.) As a result, it is found that the 1,116 chips respectively 
generate as the same identification codes as before the heating 
acceleration. (All 1,116 chips have no inconsistent bits  in the 
identification codes before and after the heating acceleration). 
This shows the unprecedentedly good retention characteristics 
of the physical chip identification. More detail of IDRAM 
property will be discusses in the conference.  
B. Proposed Concept of Physical-Logical Link 
If such a physical address is uniquely linked to a secret key, 
as illustrated in Fig. 9, it can be uniquely connected to a logical 
address via the pair of secret key and public key. Thereby, to 
protect the data transaction between logical addresses becomes 
identical to protect that between physical addresses. In other 
words, the data transaction between physical addresses may be 
able to be protected by blockchain.  
The physical chip identification is installed by replacing 
memory chip included in connected device with IDRAM chip. 
It is also noted that no change in application software is 
necessary to this installation.  Since upper layer is free from any 
change in lower layers in the communication layer structure, a 
new layer can be inserted into below datalink layer, as illustrated 
in Fig. 10. We may call it Physical-Logical Link layer in this 
report.  
By this way, the data transaction between connected devices 
is carried out with going through Physical-Logical Link layer. 
Additionally, the logical addresses are respectively combined 
with the physical addresses in Physical-Logical Link layer. As 
long as the data transaction between those logical addresses is 
protected by blockchain, the data transaction between those 
physical addresses can be protected by blockchain. This is the 
concept of Physical-Logical Link layer.  
Fig. 11 illustrates the data transaction with going through 
Physical-Logical Link layer more in detail. The upper squares 
 
Fig. 9: Linked physical address and logical address 
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Fig. 10: Communication layer including Physical-Logical Link layer 
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 are the identification cores (ID cores) and the lower ones are 
transaction units which are identical to those in Fig. 3, 
respectively. The ID core comprises a secret key, a Chip-ID and  
a key generator. The Chip-ID is some kind of code to carry out 
the physical chip identification, i.e., to define physical address 
of a semiconductor chip. More concretely, it is a code to be 
generated from physical randomness which is characteristic to a 
semiconductor chip. This Chip-ID is input to the key generator 
and the key generator generates a set of public key and secret 
key which are uniquely coupled according to the algorithm of 
Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (RSA) [9], for example.  
In the RSA method, a non-zero positive integer e may be 
given at first. This e is usually 1 + 2E16 = 65537. Next, a set of 
large prime numbers (p, q) are generated in some kind of 
method. Then, the product of those prime numbers, i.e., n = pq, 
is calculated. Hence, (e, n) is the public key. Subsequently, we 
look for an integer , where the reminder of dividing  by (p-
1)(q-1) is 1. At last, the secret key d is obtained by dividing this 
  by e.  It is noted that this (p, q) must be confidential.  
We may generate a set of large prime numbers (p, q) from 
physical randomness of semiconductor chip, and then delete it 
after generating the secret key. For example, we may add an 
arbitrarily selected positive integer to Chip-ID, and then check 
if the sum is a prime number or not.  If it is a prime number, we 
may define it as p. Next, we may add another arbitrarily selected 
positive integer to Chip-ID and then check if the sum is a prime 
number or not.  If it is a prime number, we may define it as q. It 
is also necessary to check if p and q are unequal. Those positive 
integers to be added to Chip-ID may be given by random-
number generator, given by an external input, or confidentially 
stored ahead in semiconductor chip. However, it is preferable 
that those positive integers are prime numbers each other. 
Another algorithm to generate secret key from Chip-I 
D is Elgamal’s method [10]. At first, a large prime number p and 
its primitive root g are given. Next, a hashed chip-ID may be 
divided by p-1 to form a secret key x with some arithmetic 
manipulation. Subsequently, the primitive root g to the power of 
x may be divided by the prime number p. The reminder of this 
division may be a public key. Since the secret key is generated 
before generating the public key, Fig. 11 may be replaced by Fig. 
12.  
As long as Chip-ID linked to a secret key can be regarded as 
physical address of the connected device, the physical address is 
successfully linked to the logical address, as illustrated in Fig. 9.  
In addition, if removing Chip-IDs and key generators from 
ID cores, Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 are identical to Fig. 3. It is noted 
that Chip-IDs and key generators are respectively included in 
semiconductor chips. By this way, we can also find that the 
installation of Physical-Logical Link layer is fully compatible to 
that with going through blockchain.  
C. Appplications 
All connected devices having a memory chip is possible to 
implement this IDRAM. Such a memory chip may be a stand-
alone chip of, or, an embedded chip including the followings: 
DRAM, MRAM, ReRAM, PCRAM, FRAM, NOR Flash, 
NAND Flash, Mask ROM, Junction ROM and so forth. Those 
 
 
 
Fig. 11: Data transaction with going through Physical-Logical Link layer, wherein the dashed arrow denote the hashing.  
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 are either stand-alone or embedded chips of volatile memories 
to non-volatile memories. Among them, the DRAM is a 
cheapest solution to implement the IDRAM [11]. The DRAM 
has been and will be extensively used to serve as main memories 
for any kind of processor units (CPU, MPU, GPU, GPGPU…) 
and cash memories for any kind of controllers. Accordingly, the 
stable shipment in large quantity can be expected. This is 
decisively preferable to cover as the majority of IoT as possible. 
For one of examples, the application to SSD controllers is 
presented in the Flash Memory Summit 2017 [12]. The cash 
memories (DRAM chips) of SSD controllers are replaced by 
IDRAMs with no change of the front-end-process in the 
manufacturing of DRAM; such that physical addresses and 
logical addresses are respectively connected in the Physical-
Logical Link layer, as illustrated in Fig. 10. This certainly 
prohibits the spoofing of physical addresses. Thereby, 
blockchain is allowed to protect data transaction among 
connected devices having SSDs. In a similar way, blockchain is 
allowed to protect data transaction among connected devices 
respectively having any kind of memory chips with IDRAMs, 
as mentioned above. For example, the data transaction between 
a connected device with DRAM and another connected device 
with MRAM is protected. The PUF is not always necessary, if 
blockchain can successfully cooperate with physical chip-IDs.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
IoT is a physical network. The physical network comprises 
huge number of connected devices, i.e., physical nodes 
respectively having physical addresses. However, it is still an 
open problem to protect data transaction between physical nodes 
from the illegal spoofing. On the other hand, the logical network 
comprises huge number of logical nodes respectively having 
logical addresses. The data transaction between logical 
addresses can be protected by blockchain practically-certainly. 
We then propose IDRAM; which can uniquely link physical 
address to logical address. This allows blockchain to protect the 
data transaction between physical nodes from the spoofing, i.e., 
to protect IoT.  
The IDRAM is a chip to generate physical address from 
physical randomness related to the manufacturing of memory 
chip. The installation of IDRAM is very easy. We may replace 
memory chip included in connected device with IDRAM chip,  
while no change is required in the application software working 
thereon. This means that the installation of IDRAM is fully 
compatible to blockchain as well as it is the installation of 
Physical-Logical Link layer. The possibility that two different 
IDRAM chips accidentally have a same physical address is 
about 1.0E1,042,090 (practically zero), as long as the IDRAM 
chips are manufactured in the process line of a 4Gbit 
commercial memory products. Additionally, the IDRAM chip 
can be manufactured with no change in the front-end-process of 
the mass-product memory chip.  
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Fig. 12: Data transaction with going through Physical-Logical Link layer, wherein the dashed arrow denotes the hashing.  
 
 
 
 
Hash Value 
(N-3)
Public Key (N-2)
Electronic Signature
(N-3)
Chip-ID 
(N-2)
Key 
Generator
Hashing
Secret Key 
(N-2)
ID core
Node (N-2)
Hash Value 
(N-2)
Public Key (N-1)
Electronic Signature
(N-2)
Chip-ID 
(N-1)
Key 
Generator
Secret Key 
(N-1)
Node (N-1)
Transaction unit
Hash Value 
(N-1)
Public Key (N)
Electronic Signature
(N-1)
Chip-ID 
(N)
Key 
Generator
Secret Key 
(N)
Node (N)
Hashing
H
as
h
in
g
H
as
h
in
g
H
as
h
in
g
 REFERENCES 
[1] The Code Book: The Science of Secrecy from Ancient Egypt to Quantum 
Cryptography is a book by Simon Singh, published in New York in 1999 
by Doubleday. 
[2] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, vol.IT-22, No.6, pp.644-654, Nov, 
1976. 
[3] Anonymous under the name of Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-To-
Peer Electronic Cash System”, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.  
[4] R. Merkle, “A Digital Signature Based on a Conventinal Encryption 
Function”, In CRYPTO ’87: A Conference on th eTheory and 
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology, 
pp. 369-378, 1988.  
[5] https://www.zurich.com/en/knowledge/articles/2015/04/how-many-
risks-are-there-in-billions-of-connected-devices 
[6] https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/top-three/ericsson-
backtracks-2020-vision-connected-devices/ 
[7] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas, “Physical Unclonable Functions for Device 
Authentication and Secret Key Generation”, DAC 2007, San Diego, 
California, USA, June 4-8, 2007.  
[8] F. Tehranipoor, N. Karimian, K. Xiao, and J. Chandy, “DRAM based 
Intrinsic Physicall Unclonable Funcitons for System Level Security”, 
GLSVLSI’15 Philadelphia, PA USA, 2015.  
[9] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. M. Adelman, “A Method for Obtaining Digital 
Signature and Public-key Cryptsystems”, MIT-LCS-TM-082 (MIT 
Laboratory for Computer Science), July 4, 1977.  
[10] T. Elgamal, “A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based 
on Discrete Logarithms”, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, v. 
IT-31, n. 4, 1985, pp. 469-472. 
[11] H. Watanbae and T. Hamamoto, “The cheapest physical chip-ID fully 
compatible to mass-product DRAM process”, AWAD 2017, Gyeongju, 
S. Korea, July 3-5, 2017.  
[12] H. Watanabe, “Using Blockchain to Create a Secure Controller for 
SSDs”, Flash Memory Sumit 2017, Santa Clara, California, USA, Aug. 
7-10, 2017.  
 
 
